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Traditionally, Artificial Intelligence (AI) relied strongly on models of representation and direct 
perception of the world. It was mostly concerned with functional semantics. The control of its 
robotic artifacts, for instance, was solely based on the high-level symbol-manipulation of agent-
independent semantic categories. In this approach, the environment was seen as an ensemble of 
things out there, independent and detached from the agent who is supposed to mirror them 
internally as representations .  
 
Artificial Life changed all this.  A paradigmatic example is the work of  Brooks [2], whose 
subsumption architecture  – later also known as  behavior language – replaced the traditional 
high-level control of robots with a functional modularization scheme based on behavior 
generating modules. Instead of attempting to compute behavior at an abstract level of knowledge 
representation, this bottom-up approach relies on the self-organization of simpler components to 
produce a variety of emergent behaviors that depend on the (nonlinear) interaction of a robot 
with its environment.  
 
The Artificial Life approach to AI entails a Situated/Embodied/Dynamic perspective on 
cognition. Instead of studying human cognition at the level of abstract concepts, it opted for the 
study of artificial systems inspired by simpler living organisms, not hitherto considered to be 
intelligent. Indeed, this approach blurred the conceptual distinction between Life and Cognition, 
between living and intelligent behavior.  The key idea to produce intelligent behavior is that 
embodiment does not mean merely the control of material components, but a true dynamic 
coupling between intelligent agent and environment. The dynamically coherent coupling of the 
agent with its environment is the source of behavior, and not the agent’s control system alone. 
The embodied cognition approach thus moved the modeling of intelligent systems from the study 
of intricate knowledge-based, representation-rich control systems, to the study of the dynamics 
of  networks of agent and environment components (self-organization). It can be argued that the components utilized to produce intelligent behavior from such a 
network are still too high level and do not allow the sort of plasticity that living systems observe. 
Indeed, it is not always obvious how to physically compartmentalize behavior modules: a bird’s 
wing is both an airfoil and engine at the same time [13]. The sort of behavioral decomposition 
pursued by Brooks may not have offered yet the kind of entailment or network causality found in 
living organisms [12] which allows for genuine evolution of new behaviors [3], however, it did 
mark a very important shift in the practice of AI: the transition from representation-rich, 
centralized control to a self-organizing  practice of autonomous agents. In this alternative view, 
cognition is no longer modeled as the creation of agent-independent representations of the world, 
but as the embodied, evolving, interaction of a self-organizing system with its environment. 
Whichever way embodied agents solve a problem, it is done via the construction of their own 
classifications – given the set of low-level components they have available – as they interact with 
their environment, and not by externally imposed representations. 
 
In robotics, Brooks’ behavioral decomposition using a design by hand approach was followed by 
research sharing the same principles of embodiment and situatedness, but taking the path of an 
automated evolutionary design [8, 5, 6] mostly based on evolutionary computation algorithms. 
Explicitly, this approach was meant to avoid any human designer bias. Modularity as an a priori 
design principle was abandoned. In this approach the role of human designer was weakened and 
substituted by an explicit goal of attaining more flexible, indeed unexpected sensory-motor and 
morphological structures – in the sense of both intrinsic [15] and extrinsic [7,10]  morphologies – 
via evolutionary and developmental natural principles. 
 
Central to this major switch in robotics was the emphasis on time and dynamics. For instance, 
the study of asynchronous or continuous-time networks became widespread. Indeed, the 
importance of time-dependent dynamics as an essential component of life and cognition has been 
a major issue addressed not only by the dynamical systems and embodied approach to Artificial 
Life and Robotics [1,4] but also in Cognitive Science [14, 11, 9]. 
 
All these components of a renewed, Artificial Life-inspired Cognitive Science may be brought 
under the general designation of Embodied Situated Cognition (ESC), which has now become an established approach to Cognitive Science.  This interdisciplinary field has produced numerous 
advances in Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, Social Interaction, Artificial Intelligence, Artificial 
Life, Robotics, Human-Machine Interaction, Engineering, and Informatics. On November 12
th to 
15
th, 2002, at the Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian in Lisbon, Portugal, we organized the 
International Interdisciplinary Seminar on New Robotics, Evolution and Embodied Cognition 
(IISREEC) to discuss the achievements, present state of the art, and the future of the ESC 
approach to Artificial Intelligence and Artificial Life. We invited a well established 
interdisciplinary group of researchers and organized this discussion around three inter-dependent 
themes: New Robotics, Complex Evolutionary Systems, and Embodied Cognition
1. We were 
particularly interested in tackling four sensitive topics in Embodied Cognition: 
 
1.  While ESC draws much inspiration from Nature to engineer its robots and artificial 
agents – specifically from scientific fields such as Neuroscience, Evolutionary and 
Developmental Biology – it has produced very little work of consequence to the natural 
sciences. Are the natural characteristics of artificial, embodied agents simply superficial 
metaphors, or can they be made rich enough – or indeed simple enough – to model real 
biological systems? 
2.  When ESC shifted the focus of intelligent behavior from representation-rich to self-
organizing agents, and indeed from abstract intelligent behavior to simpler, physical 
living behavior, some posited that concepts such as information, representation, and 
symbols were superfluous to understand cognition, and that the language of dynamical 
systems theory would be sufficient. Since this original contention has not been resolved, 
we encouraged participants to re-open the issue using the experience accumulated by 
practitioners in the field since its more theoretical inception. Can embodied artificial 
agents scale up to model the more symbolic and informational aspects of human 
cognition? Are information, representation, and semiotics necessary concepts to study 
Life and Cognition? 
                                                 
1 Details of the workshop are available on its web site: 
http://informatics.indiana.edu/rocha/embrob  3.  Given that the field is relatively recent, how does it stand regarding general principles or 
heuristics that its researchers share and rely upon? How far are we from a consistent 
corpus of such principles? 
4.  Are there novel paths and critical problems opening in ESC for the foreseeable future? 
 
In order to facilitate the discussion of these four topics we included researchers working in 
Biology, Complex Systems, and Social Interaction, with the set of participants traditionally 
linked to ESC. Furthermore, by encouraging participants to discuss all the issues side by side, the 
productive conference that ensued, rather than overly abstract, was grounded in specific 
biological, social, and artificial systems. This is well demonstrated in the transcripts of the 
discussions which are available at http://informatics.indiana.edu/rocha/embrob. 
 
In this volume, we present articles from most of the participants in the workshop. They offer us a 
robust view of the state of the art in ESC, and raise questions that will dictate its research agenda 
for the foreseeable future. 
 
In “The Development of Embodied Cognition: Six Lessons from Babies”, Linda Smith and 
Michael Gasser show empirical evidence from developmental psychology for the embodied 
cognition approach. They argue that embodied intelligence is not achieved simply by endowing 
intelligent agents with a body, or some physical implementation. Rather, embodied intelligence 
in humans develops as children grow in and interact with their environment via a sensory-rich 
body which is particularly fitted to recognize the statistical regularities of this interaction. 
Furthermore, the development process is very good at building on previous experience – 
particularly social experience. Finally, since symbols and language are an intricate part of the 
regularities in the social environment of human children, the embodied developmental process 
leads to intelligence unmatched in the known natural and artificial world. Thus, the work of 
Smith and Gasser, suggests that if artificial life and new robotics are to produce artificial systems 
capable of advancing our knowledge of natural cognition, it needs to focus more on the process 
of embodied development as a means to achieve a richer artificial intelligence.  Furthermore, 
Smith and Gasser also propose that language and symbols, rather than being discarded from the embodied cognition framework, should be seen as an important component of the development 
process. 
 
In “Learning From and About Others: Towards Using Imitation to Bootstrap the Social 
Understanding of Others by Robots”, Cynthia Breazeal, Daphna Buchsbaum, Jesse Gray, David 
Gatenby, and Bruce Blumberg exemplify the type of robotics/artificial life research that follows 
the embodied cognition view of child development pursued by Smith and Gasser. With the goal 
of building socially intelligent robots, Breazeal et al explore interactive imitation as an important 
component of the development of intelligence in embodied agents. The objective of their 
research is first to build robots that can interact socially with humans, but secondly to test models 
of neonatal facial imitation in infants. Indeed, they present a computational model of facial 
imitation that is developmental rather than innate, which, being based on ontogenetic interaction, 
they argue, is better suited for a theory of mind. This way, Breazeal et al show how the ESC 
approach to robots is used to both advance robotics and test models of human nature and 
behavior. 
 
In “Brain-Based Devices for the Study of Nervous Systems and the Development of Intelligent 
Machines”, Jeffrey Krichmar and Gerald Edelman exemplify the utility of ESC robotics 
approaches for testing theories of brain function. With their demonstration of how an adaptive 
device can learn to categorize on the basis of sensory information, they illustrate how novel 
embodied robotics designs, more than using metaphors from Nature, can be used as a laboratory 
for research in Biology. Indeed, unlike animal models, brain-based, robotic devices permit 
analysis of activity at all levels of the nervous system as the device behaves in its environment.  
 
In “Evolutionary Robotics: A new scientific tool for studying cognition” Inman Harvey, Ezequiel 
Di Paolo, Elio Tuci, Rachel Wood, and Matt Quinn, present and exemplify  Evolutionary 
Robotics as a scientific tool for studying minimal models of cognition. Harvey et al present 
Evolutionary Robotics as a methodology for providing existence proofs, e.g. under the form of 
sufficient conditions for the natural phenomenon under study, challenging or refuting existing 
views and unwritten assumptions. The Evolutionary Robotics methodology is furthermore presented as a useful meta-methodological tool for the Natural Sciences. This minimal model 
approach is explicitly contrasted with the approach taken by computational neurosciences.  
 
In “New Robotics: Design Principles for Intelligent Systems”, Rolf Pfeifer, Fumiya Iida, and 
Josh Bongard, present a first step towards the definition of a coherent set of heuristics or design 
principles for ESC, explicitly addressed to an interdisciplinary audience. They focus in the 
principles of “ecological balance” and “sensory-motor coordination”.  Although Pfeifer et al do 
not elaborate on dynamical systems, they also approach the representation debate indirectly since 
their definition of New Robotics entails a trade-off between morphologies and control. Because 
they prefer to emphasize the non-trivial role played by agent morphologies, materials and 
environment in the cognitive process, the need for control or of a representational level in the 
system is purposively minimized.  
 
In “From Wheels to Wings with Evolutionary Spiking Circuits”, Dario Floreano, Jean-Christophe 
Zufferey, and Jean-Daniel Nicoud, present an overview of their indoor flying project. The project 
envisages the evolutionary development of a vision-based micro-robot whose controller is 
composed of adaptive spiking neurons. Floreano et al point out that robotics research in ESC has 
been dominated by far by terrestrial robots, focusing much more on theoretical and algorithmic 
issues rather than on energetic autonomy. Bio-inspired flying robotics, draws our attention to the 
complexity and variety of morphological, bio-mechanical, sensory and neural structures, found 
by evolution to cope with the requirements for flight – thus opening a novel research area. From 
a sensory-motor point of view, navigating in the air is a very complex, dynamical task, 
demanding efficient and adaptive neural circuits. Spiking neural networks were chosen to 
capture these complexities. The evolutionary approach to design pursued by the authors is 
chosen to reduce human design choices, a principle also defended by Harvey et al in their article. 
Affinities of principle – regarding the emphasis on the balance between morphologies and 
control – are also shared with the article by Pfeifer et al.  
 
In “Flexible Couplings: Diffusing neuromodulators and adaptive robotics”, Andy Philippides, 
Phil Husbands, Tom Smith, and Michael O’Shea present two new  variants of the GasNet model,  
which are shown to improve evolvability. This occurs, the authors claim, as a result of the flexible loose coupling of yet distinct – chemical, electrical – processes. The paper draws on 
evidence from neurosciences and is described as a first step in the study of the coupling issue. It 
may also be a step in the direction of a deeper, two-way interchange between robotics and 
neuroscience. 
 
In “Agency in natural and artificial systems”, Alvaro Moreno and Arantza Etxeberria elaborate 
on whether it is possible to artificially build an organization similar to the natural. They base 
their treatment of the differences between natural and artificial systems on the notion of agency, 
the conditions for which they analyze. They observe that the deep interrelation between forms of 
organization and materiality in natural systems does not occur in robots, given the latter’s 
different embodiment. Thus, they conclude, the particular embodiments of artificial systems 
impose qualitative differences in the resulting morphologies, from what is achieved by natural 
systems. This conclusion highlights the difficulty of using artificial systems to study natural 
phenomena. 
 
In “Transient phenomena in learning and evolution: genetic assimilation and genetic 
redistribution”, Janet Wiles, James Watson, Bradley Tonkes, and Terrence Deacon use 
evolutionary computation to explore the process by which functional dependence of genes can be 
transferred from one initial set to many sets, as changes in the environment mask and unmask 
selective pressures (genetic redistribution). Their simulations build on models of genetic 
assimilation, such as the Baldwin effect, by which phenotypic-level behavior, such as learning, 
influences genetic specification. Wiles et al further discuss the relevance of genetic assimilation 
and genetic redistribution to the evolution of language and other cognitive adaptations.  
 
In “Material Representations: From the Genetic Code to the Evolution of Cellular Automata”, 
Luis Mateus Rocha and Wim Hordijk” present a definition of the concept of representation that 
relies on a study of the origin of structures that can be used to store memory in evolving systems.  
This study is based on what is known about genetic memory in Biology, and from novel 
computer experiments in the evolution of Cellular Automata to solve nontrivial tasks in complex 
systems theory. Their goal is to show how knowledge of real Biology and Artificial Life experiments can be used to shed new light on the representation debate in ESC, and indeed 
function as a constructive bridge between the dynamicist and representationalist camps. 
 
In “Friends Reunited? Evolutionary Robotics and Representational Explanation”, Michael 
Wheeler draws on a major assumption: that the contentious debates of the early and mid nineties, 
between representational and non -representational explanations have faded away. At the time, 
New Robotics took a firm stand for the non-representational camp, but according to the author, a 
rapprochement between the two camps is now under way. Wheeler digs out two challenges –  
which he dubs “non-trivial causal spread” and “continuous reciprocal causation” –  posed by 
New Robotics to representationalism. He argues that a transformation of the notion of 
representation took place in Artificial Life inspired robotics, which “is not at odds with the 
situated approach to real-time intelligent action” and then discusses whether the two challenges 
can be faced from that perspective. The evolutionary robotics part of the discussion mostly draws 
evidence from the evolution of GasNets and evolvable hardware. A conclusion is presented that 
while a system involving non-trivial causal spread can still be representational in character, the 
evolution of systems like GasNets and evolvable hardware often display high degrees of 
continuous reciprocal causation resistant to representational analysis.  
 
In “Beyond the flesh: some lessons from a Mole Cricket”, Andy Clark deals with the treatment of 
symbols in Embodied Cognition. In particular, on how should a dynamical systems approach to 
cognition conceptualize their role. Clark presents symbols as another powerful technological 
prop in extended cognitive loops that involve embodied agents and different types of 
technological and cultural scaffolds. Such internal and external props, via cascades of encodings, 
allow us to map complicated problems into simpler surrogate situations.  Thus he proposes that 
we study the mind as an embodied system that reaches far beyond the flesh.  
 
Acknowledgments. 
 
The IISREEC seminar in Lisbon had its origin in an invitation addressed to us by Professor 
Fernando Gil who was organizing a series of scientific meetings on the state-of-the-art of various 
disciplines. We are profoundly indebted to him for his prescience of the present and future 
importance of the matters covered by the meeting.  
We also wish to thank Marta Lança. (secretariat), all the participants, chairpersons and invited 
discussants at the meeting, and all the external reviewers for this special issue, who provided 
most valuable feedback in our edition process. We are also very grateful to the Journal Artificial 
Life and particularly its editor Mark Bedau for accepting our proposal for this special issue, and 
for providing guidance and support throughout the edition process. 
 
Last but not least, we are very grateful for the support granted by the GlaxoSmithKline and 
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundations for the organization of the workshop, and, above all, the great 
support of the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia and its President, Fernando Ramôa 
Ribeiro. Due to fortuitous circumstances Prof. Ramôa Ribeiro was not able to present his closing 
communication to the seminar, as scheduled. Thus, we include an appendix after this 
introductory article with the transcription of that communication to the seminar. 
 
Finally, with affection and respect, we would like to dedicate this issue to Esther Thelen who is 
one of the most influential progenitors of ESC. 
 
Fernando Almeida e Costa 
Luis Mateus Rocha 
  
References 
 
[1] Beer, R. D. (1995). “A dynamical systems perspective on agent-environment interaction.” In Artificial 
Intelligence, 72, 173-215. 
[2] Brooks, R.A. (1991). “Intelligence without reason.” In: Proceedings of the 12th International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, San Mateo 2992. . Morgan Kaufmann. 
[3] Cariani, P. (1992). “Emergence and Artificial Life.” In: Artificial Life II. C. Langton et al. (eds.). SFI 
Series in the SciencesComplexity. Addison-Wesley, pp. 775-797. 
[4] Cariani, P. (1995), “As if time really mattered: temporal strategies for neural coding of sensory 
information” Communication and Cognition - Artificial Intelligence (CC-AI) 12(1-2), 161-229. 
Reprinted in: K Pribram, ed. Origins: Brain and Self-Organization, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum, 1994; 208-252. [5] Cliff D., Harvey I. and Husbands P. (1993). “Explorations in evolutionary robotics”. Adaptive 
Behavior, 2:73-110 
[6] Floreano D. and Mondada F. (1994 ). “Automatic creation of an autonomous agent: genetic evolution 
of a neural-network driven robot”. In D. Cliff, P. Husbands, J. Meyer and S.W. Wilson (Eds.), 
From Animals to Animats 3: Proceedings of the Third Conference on Simulation of Adaptive 
Behavior. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books 
[7] Funes P. and Pollack J. (1998). “Evolutionary Body Building: Adaptive physical designs for robots”. 
Artificial Life 4: 337-357  
[8] Husbands P. and Harvey I. (1992). “Evolution versus Design: Controlling Autonomous Robots In 
Integrating Perception, Planning and Action”: Proceedings of 3rd Annual Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence, Simulation and Planning, IEEE Press, 139-146.  
[9] Pattee, H. H. 1995, “Evolving self-reference: matter, symbols, and semantic closure”. Communication 
and Cognition – Artificial Intelligence (CC-AI) 12(1-2), 9-27. 
[10] Pfeifer, R. (2000). “On the role of morphology and materials in adaptive behavior”. From animals to 
Animats. Proceedings of the 6
th Int. Conference on the Simulation of Adaptive Behavior. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 
[11] Port, R. and Gelder, T. (1995) Mind as Motion. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 
[12] Prem, E. (1995). “Grounding and the entailment structure in robots and Artificial Life.” In: Advances 
in Artificial Life. F.Moran, A. Moreno, J.J. Merelo, and P. Chacon (eds.). Springer-Verlag, pp. 
39-52.  
[13] Rosen, R. (1993). “Bionics revisited.” In: The Machine as a Metaphor and Tool. H. Haken, A. 
Karlqvist, and U. Svedin (eds.). Springer-Verlag, pp. 87-100. 
[14] Thelen, E. e Smith, L. (1998) A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and 
Action. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
[15] Thompson, A. (1997). “Artificial Evolution in the Physical World”. In Gomi, Takashi (ed.) (1997) 
Evolutionary Robotics: from intelligent robots to artificial life (ER’97), AAI Books 
  
Appendix to the Introduction 
 
Communication from the President of the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia  
(Portuguese  Foundation for Science and Technology) 
 
As President of the Foundation for Science and Technology I am particularly pleased with the 
organisation in Lisbon of the Seminar on Robotics and would like to thank the organizers for this 
opportunity to greet its participants, particularly the speakers that have contributed most to its 
success. 
 
My particular scientific area is chemical engineering and is therefore far from the themes that 
brought you here. Therefore you cannot expect this address to be one scientific communication 
to fit the seminar. But I look at your subject as an interested outsider and it is not difficult for me 
to understand the importance of the presentations and discussions that you held. 
Robotics has been for several years an area which, in Portugal, has been funded rather above the 
average. Recently, this research has particularly benefited from the POSI, which is a structural 
financing program especially dedicated to the information society and managed by the 
Foundation for Science and Technology. And, in agreement with the expert international 
evaluation that the research centres go through every three years, I dare say that some groups in 
the area have reached an excellent level, which is otherwise shown by their publications and 
achievements. 
 
We have seen that robots become more and more sophisticated and even play football, which is 
certainly a rather unexpected goal for the development of science... FCT will even be supporting 
the Robo Cup 2004, which is something like a football world–cup for robots. However, these 
players still don’t shout or swear at each other, and don’t kick each other knees. And it is in this 
context that your seminar becomes important in terms of studying and discussing the new 
robotics, in which there is a continuing convergence between robotics and the life sciences. 
 
It is interesting to go through the titles of some of the presentations. They mention “sociable 
robots”, “artificial intelligence”, “machine psychology”, “embodiment”, “evolution”, etc. They all show this final aim of robotics which is to be able to build life or something similar to life. 
However you have also realized the difficulty of this task and the importance of your efforts. It is 
therefore an amazing trend and I am sure that your field of science and technologies will in the 
next few years continue to deliver extraordinary results. 
 
Biologists and doctors will be among the first to find the importance of your developments and 
certainly among the first to use your achievements.  
 
We, at the Foundation of Science and Technology, will continue to watch and support the 
scientific advances in the area, and I wish that this shall be a contribution to ensure that the 
Portuguese scientists will be able to maintain their status in the context of the international 
community. 
 
    Fernando  Ramôa  Ribeiro 